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Abstract—In this paper, we present the first attack methodology
to extract black-box Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) models
only from their actions with the environment. Model extraction
attacks against supervised Deep Learning models have been
widely studied. However, those techniques cannot be applied
to the reinforcement learning scenario due to DRL models’
high complexity, stochasticity and limited observable information.
Our methodology overcomes those challenges by proposing two
techniques. The first technique is an RNN classifier which can
reveal the training algorithms of the target black-box DRL model
only based on its predicted actions. The second technique is the
adoption of imitation learning to replicate the model from the
extracted training algorithm. Experimental results indicate that
the integration of these two techniques can effectively recover
the DRL models with high fidelity. We also demonstrate a use
case to show that our model extraction attack can significantly
improve the success rate of adversarial attacks, making the DRL
models more vulnerable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Reinforcement Learning has gained popularity due
to its strong capability of handling complex tasks and en-
vironments. It integrates Deep Learning (DL) architectures
and reinforcement learning algorithms to build sophisticated
policies, which can accurately understand the environmental
context (states), and make the optimal decisions (actions).
Various DRL algorithms and methodologies have been de-
signed to facilitate the application of DRL in different artificial
intelligent tasks, e.g., autonomous driving [1], robot motion
planning [2], video game playing [3], etc.
As DRL has been widely commercialized (e.g., autonomous
driving framework Wayve [4], path planning system MobilEye
[5]), it is of paramount importance for model owners to
protect the intellectual property of their DRL-based products.
DRL models are generally deployed as black boxes inside
the applications, so the model designs and parameters are not
disclosed to the public.
Problem statement. From the adversarial perspective, we
want to address the following question in this paper: is
it possible for an adversary to extract the properties (i.e.,
training algorithm) of a black-box DRL model, and produce a
replicated model with the same behaviors? This is known as
model extraction attacks, which have been widely studied in
supervised DL models [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16].
However, the possibility and feasibility of extracting DRL
models have not been explored yet. We make a first step
towards this goal.
It is worth noting that our goal is to extract the DRL model
algorithm and replicate its behaviors. It is impossible to extract
the values of model parameters: different parameter values can
give the same model behaviors, which are indistinguishable
from the adversary. Also the adversary cannot identify the
values of dead neurons which never contribute to the model
output.
Threat model. We assume the adversary has the domain
knowledge of the target DRL model, i.e., the task the model is
performing, the environmental context, and also the formats of
the model input and output. However, he has little knowledge
about the DRL model itself, including the model structures
and parameter values, training methods and hyper-parameters,
etc. We further assume the adversary is able to operate the
DRL model or product in a controllable environment: he
can set certain environmental states, and observe the model’s
corresponding actions.
Challenges. Although various extraction techniques were de-
signed against supervised DL models, it is hard to apply them
to DRL models due to significant differences of model features
and scenarios.
First, some attack approaches can only extract very simple
models and datasets. For instance, the method in [9] can only
work for two-layer neural networks (one hidden layer and a
ReLU layer). The method in [6] is only applicable to simple
models with simple datasets (e.g., MNIST) constrained by
the computing power. In contrast, DRL models usually have
more complicated and deeper network structures to handle
complex tasks. As such, the above techniques fail to extract
DRL models.
Second, the adversary in our threat model has less ob-
servable information for model extraction. Past works assume
the adversary has access to the prediction confidence scores
[9, 6, 7, 12], gradients [10] or the side-channel execution
characteristics [11, 13, 14, 15]. In our scenario, the adversary
can only observe the predicted actions from the DRL model.
This can also invalidate the above methods.
Third, supervised DL models perform predictions over
discrete input samples, which are independent of each other.
However, DRL is a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Individ-
ual input samples cannot fully reflect the inherent features of
DRL models and training algorithms. The adversary will lose
the information of temporal relationships if he only observes
these discrete data. Besides, compared to supervised DL
models, DRL models are more stochastic and their behaviors
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Fig. 1: Overview of our proposed DRL model extraction attack
highly depend on the environments with different transition
probabilities.
Contribution. We propose a novel model extraction approach
for DRL model which can overcome the above challenges. It
is composed of two techniques.
The first technique is to build a classifier which can identify
the algorithm of the target DRL model based on its runtime
actions. This technique has three innovations: (1) We use a
timing sequence of actions as the feature of a DRL model
to characterize its decision process and interaction with en-
vironment. (2) We utilize Recurrent Neural Networks as the
structure of the classifier for training and prediction, which can
better understand the temporal relationships inside the feature
sequence. (3) For one DRL model with the same algorithm,
we will generate different feature sequences in environments
initialized with different random seeds. This guarantees that
the training set of the classifier is comprehensive and including
different behaviors of the same model.
The second technique is to adopt imitation learning to
replicate the behaviors of the target model based on the ex-
tracted algorithm. We use the Generative Adversarial Imitation
Learning (GAIL) framework [17] to achieve this process.
The contest between the discriminative model and generative
model can guarantee that our replication has similar behaviors
as the target one within the environment.
The integration of RNN classification and imitation learning
can produce replicated models with high similarity of training
algorithm, behavior and performance with the target model.
This can bring severe threats of copyright infringement and
economic loss to the DRL-based applications and products.
More seriously, we provide a use case to show that this attack
approach can significantly enhance the adversarial attacks by
increasing the attack transferability and success rate. This
demonstrates the practical value of our study, and is expect
to raise people’s awareness about the privacy threats of DRL
models, as well as the necessity of defense solutions.
II. BACKGROUND
Deep Reinforcement Learning. DRL adopts deep learning
technology to instruct an agent to act in a given task, in order
to maximize the expected cumulative rewards. The deep neural
networks adopted by DRL are powerful to understand and
interpret complex environmental states, and make the optimal
decisions. There are three common approaches to solve rein-
forcement learning tasks. The first one is value function based
methods. The DRL algorithm trains deep neural networks
to approximate the optimal value functions. For instance, a
common value-based algorithm is deep Q-network (DQN)
[3], which learns Q value estimates for each state-action pair
independently. The second category is policy search based
methods. The DRL algorithm attempts to identify the optimal
policy. Typical examples include REINFORCE [18] which
optimize policies directly. The third category is the hybrid
of value function and policy search (actor-critic approach).
These algorithms learn both a policy and a state value function
to reduce variance and accelerate learning. State-of-the-art
algorithms include Proximal policy optimisation (PPO) [19],
Actor-Critic with Experience Replay (ACER) [20] and Actor
Critic using Kronecker-Factored Trust Region (ACKTR) [21].
Imitation Learning. Imitation learning [22] is a process of
acquiring skills or behaviors by observing demonstrations of
an expert performing the corresponding tasks. It was originally
for learning from human demonstrations. Then the concept
of imitation learning was applied to the domain of artificial
experts, such as reinforcement learning agents. Various imi-
tation learning techniques have been designed to imitate the
behaviors of DRL models [17, 23].
Adversarial Examples. It has been found that small and
undetectable perturbations in input samples could affect the
results of a target classifier [24]. Following this initial study,
many researchers designed various attack methods to attack
supervised DL models [25, 26, 27]. Adversarial attacks on
RL policies have also received some attention for the past
years. Huang et al. [28] made an initial attempt to attack
neural network policies by applying FGSM to the state at each
time step. Following this work, black-box adversarial attacks
against DRL were demonstrated in [29]. Russo and Proutiere
[30] found the adversarial examples can be also transferred
across different DRL models.
Privacy in Machine Learning. There have been a quantity
of works on the privacy threats of deep learning models and
data. Model extraction attacks aim to steal model parameters
or architectures [7, 6]. Membership inference attacks [31]
are designed to determine if a given data sample has been
included in the training data. Model inversion attacks [32]
aim to leverage model predictions to inverse the training data
properties. In this paper, we are focusing on model extraction
attacks.
III. ATTACK METHODOLOGY
Our attack approach consists of two stages. At the first stage,
we construct a classifier, which can predict the training algo-
rithm of a given black-box DRL model based on its runtime
behavior. At the second stage, based on the extracted algo-
rithm, we adopt state-of-the-art imitation learning technique to
generate and fine-tune a model with the similar behaviors as
the victim one. Figure 1 illustrates the methodology overview,
and Algorithm 1 describes the detailed steps.
A. Extracting DRL Model Algorithms via RNN Classification
As the first stage, we train a RNN classifier, whose input
is a DRL model’s action sequence, and output is the model’s
training algorithm. With this classifier, we are able to identify
the algorithm of an arbitrary black-box DRL model.
Dataset preparation. A dataset is necessary to train this clas-
sifier. It should consist of enough samples to cover models with
different algorithms, as well as various behaviors. We train a
large quantity of shadow DRL models in the same environment
but with various algorithms, and collect their behaviors to form
this dataset. Specifically, we set up a algorithm pool P that
includes all the training algorithm in our consideration. We
prepare a set S of random seeds for environment initialization.
Then for each algorithm in the pool P, we train some DRL
models with this algorithm in various environments initialized
by different random seeds in S. We evaluate the performance
of each trained DRL model by measuring its reward and
comparing it with a reward threshold R: we only select the
DRL models whose reward is higher than R. For each qualified
model, we collect N different state-action sequences with a
length of T : {(s1, a1), (s2, a2), ...(sT , aT )}. Then samples are
generated with the action sequences (A = {a1, a2, ...aT }) as
Algorithm 1: Extracting DRL models
Input: target model M∗, DRL environment env
Output: Replicated model M ′
/* Stage 1 */
1 Set up a set of random seeds S ;
2 Select algorithm pool P, reward threshold R, sequence length
T ;
3 Dataset D = ∅ ;
4 for each p ∈ P do
5 for each s ∈ S do
6 env.initialize(s);
7 m = train_DRL(env, p);
8 if evaluate(m, env) > R then
9 A = GenSequence(m, env, T );
10 D.add([A, p]);
11 end
12 end
13 end
14 C = train_RNN(D);
/* Extract model algorithm */
15 A∗ = GenSequence(M∗, env, T );
16 P ∗ = C.predict(A∗)
/* Stage 2 */
17 M ′ = IimiatationLearning(M∗, P ∗, env);
18 while evaluate(M ′, env) < evaluate(M∗, env) do
19 M ′ = IimiatationLearning(M∗, P ∗, env);
20 end
21 return M ′
the feature and the training algorithm as the label, to construct
the dataset.
Training. We train a Recurrent Neural Network over the
prepared dataset for the classifier. A RNN is competent of
processing sequence data of arbitrary lengths by recursively
applying a transition function to its internal hidden state vector
of the input. It is generally used to map the input sequence to
a fixed-sized vector, which will be further fed to a softmax
layer for classification. However, vanilla RNNs are well-
known to suffer from the gradient vanishing and exploding
problem: during training, components of the gradient vector
can grow or decay exponentially over long sequences. To
address this issue, we adopt the Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) network [33] in our approach. LSTMs can selectively
remember or forget things regulated by a set of gates. Each
gate in LSTM units is composed of a sigmoid neural net
layer and a pointwise multiplication operation, which can
filter the information through the network. As a result, LSTM
units can maintain information in memory for a long period
under the control of gates. To train the classifier, for each
input sequence A = {a1, a2, ..., aT }, we first apply a set
of LSTM layers to obtain its vector representation. Then
we attach a fully-connected layer and a non-linear softmax
layer after the LSTMs to output the probability distribution
over all classes of possible model algorithms. We use cross-
entropy of the predicted and ground-truth labels as the loss
function to identify the optimal parameters for this classifier
by minimizing the loss function.
Extracting model algorithms. With this RNN classifier, we
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Fig. 2: The accuracy of RNN classifier for different algorithms
are now able to predict the training algorithm of a given
back-box DRL model. We operate this target model in the
same environment with certain random seed and collect the
action sequence for T rounds. We query the classifier with this
sequence and get the probability of each candidate algorithm.
We select the one with the highest probability as the attack
result. To further increase the confidence and eliminate the
stochastic effects, we can run the target model in different
initialized environments and collect the sequences for predic-
tions. We choose the most-predicted label as the target model’s
algorithm.
B. Replicating DRL Models via Imitation Learning
With the extracted model algorithm, the adversary can train
a new model (or just pick a shadow DRL model during the
classifier training step) with the same algorithm as the replica
of the target model. However, due to the complexity of DRL
algorithms and variance of initial environment, this replicated
model can still exhibit distinct behaviors from the real one,
even they are from the same algorithm. This stage aims to
refine the replicated model via imitation learning.
Imitation learning aims to mimic expert behavior in a given
task. An imitation model learns skills to perform a task
from expert demonstrations by learning a mapping between
observations and actions [22]. Recently, several works conduct
model imitating on DRL models, e.g., GAIL[17] and DQfD
[23]. In our case, we adopt the GAIL algorithm to replicate
DRL models. GAIL is a model-free learning algorithm that
can obtain significant performance gains in imitating complex
behaviors in large-scale and high-dimensional environments.
Specifically, two models are constructed to contest with each
other during the imitation process: a generative DRL model
G with the extracted algorithm, and a discriminative model
D whose job is to distinguish the distribution of data gen-
erated by G from the ground-truth data distribution (i.e.,
expert trajectory) from the target DRL model. The trajectory
data for generative model and target model is a sequence
of {(s1, a1), (s2, a2), ..., (sT , aT )}. The generative model G
iteratively refines its parameters based on the feedback from
D until D cannot distinguish the data generated from G or
the target model.
After the imitated model is produced, considering the
stochasticity of learning progress, it is possible that it cannot
reach the same reward although it has the same behaviors
as the target model. Therefore, we repeat the GAIL process
until a qualified model is obtained which has high very similar
performance (i.e., reward) as the target model.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Implementation and Experimental Setup
Our attack approach is general-purpose and applicable to
various reinforcement learning environments. Without loss
of generality, we consider two popular environments: Cart-
Pole and Atari Pong [34]. For each environment, we train
DRL models with five mainstream DRL algorithms (DQN [3],
PPO [19], ACER [20], (ACKTR) [21] and A2C [35]). We
use the default training settings and hyperparameters in the
OpenAIBaselines framework. For each environment, we select
50 trained models whose rewards are higher than the baseline
R as introduced in OpenAI Baselines framework [34].
For RNN classification, we consider different sequence
lengths T (50, 100 and 200), and compare their impacts on
the RNN classification accuracy. For each trained DRL model,
we collect 50 sequences of actions as the training input of
our RNN classifier. Therefore, for Cart-Pole and Atari Pong,
the sizes of the data set we collected from 250 trained DRL
models are both 12,500. To evaluate the trained RNN classifier,
we splits the data set to training and test sets randomly.
Moreover, we consider various RNN structures. During the
training process, the initial learning rate is set to 0.005 with a
decay factor of 0.7 whenever loss plateaus, and the batch size
is set to 32. We stop the training after N = 100 iterations.
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Fig. 3: Average accuracy
B. Results of RNN Classification
Impact of hyper-parameters. The predication accuracy of the
RNN classifier can be affected by a few hyper-parameters, e.g.,
the length of the input sequence, the number of hidden layers.
Figure 3 shows the accuracy under different combinations of
these hyper-parameters. First, we observe that the length of
the input sequence can affect the classification performance: a
longer input sequence can give a higher accuracy. Therefore,
for Cart-Pole environment, we take all the actions within
one episode as the input sequence (T=200). For Atari Pong
environment, one episode can have up to 10,000 actions.
It is not recommended to take the entire episode as input,
which can incur very high cost and training over-fitting. Since
T = 200 can already give us very satisfactory accuracy, we
will set the length of input sequence to 200 as well.
Second, we consider different numbers of hidden LSTM
layers (1 and 2) for the classifier. We observe that this factor
has slight influence on the accuracy of the classifier. One
hidden layer can already validate the effectiveness of the RNN
classification. So in the following experiments, we will adopt
a 1-layer RNN for simplicity.
Third, the action space can also affect the classification
accuracy. Higher-dimensional actions can contain more infor-
mation about the DRL model. Thus, it will be easier and more
accurate to classify them. In our case, the action space of Cart-
Pole environment is 2 while that of Atari Pong environment
is 6. Then the classifier of Atari Pong has a higher accuracy
than Cart-Pole, as reflected in Figure 3.
Accuracy of each class. Figure 2 shows the confusion matrix
for both two environments. We observe the RNN classifier
can distinguish DRL models of each algorithm with very high
confidence. For most cases, the prediction accuracy is above
70%; the best case is up to 100% (i.e. DQN models in Atari
Pong); the worst case is 54% (ACER models in Cart-Pole),
which is still much higher than random choice (20%). The
prediction accuracy of the DQN model is particularly high
(0.95 in Cart-Pole, and 1 in Atari Pong). The reason behind
this is that DQN is a value-based algorithm while all the other
four algorithms are actor-critic methods. So DQN models are
easier to be distinguished.
C. Explanation of RNN Classification
We quantitatively explain and validate why our RNN classi-
fier is able to distinguish different DRL algorithms. We adopt
the Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations (LIME)
framework [36], which attempts to understand a model by
perturbing its input and observing how the output changes.
Specifically, it modifies a single data sample by tweaking
the feature values and observes the resulting impact on the
output to determine which features play an important role in
the model predictions.
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In our case, we build a explainer with LIME on our RNN
classifier. Then, we randomly select 200 explanation instances
from the training data of the classifier from the shadow
DRL models trained in Atari Pong environment in Section
III-A. We feed these instances to the explainer and obtain
the explanation results. For each explanation instance, we
identify the feature (i.e., one action of input sequence) which
contributes most to the prediction. Through the analysis of
these features, we can discover the different behaviors of DRL
models trained from different algorithms. Fig. 4 shows the
contribution of the actions (UP, DOWN, IDLE) with prominent
impacts on the prediction in each input sequence. We can
observe that different DRL algorithms give very different
behavior preferences. A2C tends to issue important actions
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Fig. 5: The reward of the replicated model during the imitation learning progress
of UP at the beginning of the sequence; ACKTR prefers to
give the action of DOWN also at the task beginning; DQN has
a higher chance to predict IDLE clustering at the beginning;
PPO issues the DOWN action all over the sequence with a large
variance of contribution factor; ACER has important actions
of UP and IDLE with similar contributions spanning all over
the sequence. This shows those DRL algorithms have quite
different characteristics in making action decisions, giving the
classifier an opportunity to distinguish them just based on the
action sequence.
D. Results of Imitation Learning
We demonstrate the effectiveness of imitation learning for
model replication. To train the replicated models, GAIL algo-
rithm is applied to imitate behaviors from the target model. As
implemented in OpenAI baseline [34], the generator of GAIL
can be PPO or TRPO policies. Without loss of generality, we
select PPO as the generator.
Imitating Performance. The replicated model with the same
algorithm can reach similar performance (i.e., reward) as
the target model after imitation learning. Without loss of
generality, we show this effect in Cart-Pole environment. We
consider the adversary has identified the training algorithm via
RNN classification, and then use this algorithm for imitation
learning. Figure 5a shows the fine-tuning process (the target
model is trained with PPO). We can observe that in the first
imitation cycle, the replicated model cannot reach the same
performance as the target one, as it has been supervised to
learn the random behaviors of the target model with low
rewards. Then we start a new imitation cycle, and now the
learned model can get the same reward as the victim model.
We can stop with this replica, or continue to identify more
qualified ones (at the 6th cycle). In contrast, we also consider a
case where the adversary does not know the training algorithm,
and randomly pick one for imitation learning. Figure 5b shows
the corresponding imitation process (the target model uses
DQN while the adversary selects PPO generator). Now the
replicated model can never get the same performance as
the target model. This indicates the importance of extracted
algorithm from the RNN classification, in order to perform
high-quality imitation learning.
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Imitating behaviors. In addition to performance, the repli-
cated model can also learn the similar behaviors as the target
model. Since the output of a DRL model is a probability
distribution over legal actions, we adopt the Jensen-Shannon
(JS) divergence [37] to measure the similarity of the action
probability distributions between the replicated model and
the target model. We still use the PPO policy in the Cart-
Pole environment for illustration. We consider three cases:
(1) the similarity between the target model and itself (i.e.,
collecting the behaviors twice). This serves as the baseline for
comparison. (2) the similarity between the target model and
the replicated model from imitation learning; (3) the similarity
between the target model and a shadow model with the same
training algorithm. For each case, we feed the same states
to the two models in comparison, sample 100 actions from
each model, compute the action probability distributions and
the divergence between these two action distributions. Fig.
6 shows the cumulative probability of the JS divergence for
each case. We can observe that cumulative probability of JS
divergence in both case (1) and (2) increases sharply to 1.
This indicates that the replicated model indeed has very similar
behaviors as the target model. In contrast, the divergence of
action probability distributions between the shadow model and
target model can be very high. Even they are trained from the
same algorithm, their behaviors are still quite distinct in the
same environment. We can conclude that through imitation
learning with the extracted algorithm, the replicated model
can behave very closely with the target one.
V. CASE STUDY: ENHANCING ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we present a case study to show how an
adversary can leverage the model extraction technique to cause
severe damages to the victim.
Generally, there are three types of adversarial attacks,
white-box, grey-box and black-box attacks, determined by the
adversary’s knowledge of the victim model [38]. The black-
box scenario is the most realistic setting as the information
and details of the DL models are usually confidential for
intellectual property protection. However, black-box attacks
have lower success rates than grey-box attacks due to the
low transferability across models with different algorithms.
Such distinction is more prominent for DRL models for their
complexity and large diversity. So to enhance the adver-
sarial attacks against black-box DRL models, we can use
the proposed model extraction attack to turn the black-box
models into grey-box ones. Specifically, we extract the training
algorithm from the black-box DRL model and replicate a new
one. Then we generate adversarial examples via conventional
methods from the parameters of the replicated model, and use
them to attack the target black-box one.
Implementation. We evaluate the effectiveness of adversarial
examples in Atari Pong environment. The target black-box
model can use one training algorithm and configurations. The
adversary may choose an arbitrary different algorithm to train
a shadow model, or use model extraction method to identify
the target model algorithm and replicate a new model. For
each case, we adopt the FGSM technique [25] to generate
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Fig. 7: The transferability of adversarial examples across
different DRL algorithms
1,000 adversarial examples and measure their success rates on
the target model.
Results. Fig. 7 reports the transferability of adversarial ex-
amples across different model algorithms under the same
perturbation scale. We can observe that the success rate
increases when the replicated model has the same training
algorithm as the target model. The reason behind this is that
the gradients of the DRL models with the same algorithm
are closer than the ones with different algorithms. Therefore,
adversarial examples are easier to be transferred to the models
with the same algorithm, even when their parameters are
different. This indicates that our model extraction technique
can significantly enhance the adversarial attack effects on the
black-box DRL models.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design a novel attack methodology to
steal DRL models. We utilize RNN classification and Gen-
erative Adversarial Imitation Learning, to extract the model
algorithms, imitate their behaviors and performance. With
such powerful attack techniques, an adversary can recover the
DRL models with high fidelity only by observing the actions
other than prediction confidence score. Such minimal attack
requirements can invalidate the common defenses against
model extraction attacks, e.g., perturbing the output probability
[7, 39, 40], removing the probabilities for some classes [7],
returning only the class output [7, 39], query pattern analysis
[41, 42], watermarking [43, 44]. We expect this study can
inspire people’s awareness about the severity of DRL model
privacy issue, and come up with better solutions to mitigate
such model extraction attacks.
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